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The European Political Strategy Centre – the European 
Commission’s in-house think tank – has recently produced a 
foresight analysis, proposing the renewal of the European 
Union (EU)’s Arctic policy (EPSC 2019). One of its key 
recommendations is to prepare a new Joint Communication 
on Arctic matters. This policy brief adds to the ongoing 
discussion by considering whether such a document is 
needed at this time and how it could differ from previous EU 
Arctic statements. First, we present a brief history of the 
EU’s Arctic endeavour and consider new developments – 
including geopolitical changes – in the region since the latest 
EU-Arctic policy statement adopted in 2016. We then reflect 
on possible ideas for a future policy statement (a new Joint 
Communication), and conclude by assessing policy options 
and their respective limitations. 
Ever since 2007-2008, the EU’s main institutions have devel-
oped a dedicated set of Arctic-related documents, defined po-
sitions and expressed the EU’s very own ‘Arcticness’ (Raspot-
nik 2018). By 2019, ten Arctic policy documents have been 
produced: three (Joint) Communications by the Commission 
(and the High Representative – HR); three related Conclusions 
by the Council; and four Resolutions by the European Parlia-
ment (EP). Essentially, these documents identify the EU as part 
of and linked to the Arctic, affecting and affected by the Arctic. 
The latest rendition of the Commission and HR, issued in 2016, 
was structured around three broad themes: 
 Climate change and safeguarding the environment; 
 Sustainable development in the (European) Arctic; 
 International cooperation on Arctic issues. 
Visible from these three priority areas, the EU’s Arctic policy 
covers a vast spectrum of domains – of both internal and ex-
ternal nature. This ranges from the EU’s climate change miti-
gation actions to protecting the regional environment, from 
sustainably exploiting the region’s resources to fostering eco-
nomic growth in the European Arctic, and from participating 
in international Arctic cooperation to the engagement with 
the Arctic’s Indigenous Peoples. Accordingly, the Arctic policy 
umbrella attracts a broad range of different stakeholders and 
opinions on the region’s future. 
Although EU officials have aimed to integrate these various 
policy fields into one overarching approach, the results have 
largely remained a mere aggregation of keywords. The various 
policy statements are mostly focused on identifying existing 
EU Arctic-relevant actions, while simultaneously formulating 
overarching abstract objectives (Kobza 2015; Stepien et al. 
2016). The result has been high-level rhetoric, which is in stark 
contrast to the limited and rather superficial interests in Arctic 
matters across Europe, and especially within the EU. 
Another implication of the broad yet marginal character of 
the EU’s Arctic policy continues to be the difficulty in clearly 
stating the EU’s northern ambitions and further developing a 
convincing EU-Arctic narrative. Considering the current status 
of regional development and the EU-Arctic nexus, one needs 
to ask if any ‘Arctic narrative’ currently exists that is legiti-
mate, but also compelling and engaging (Stępień & Raspotnik 
2015). 
Executive Summary 
> The EU’s Arctic policy statements have so far 
been primarily aggregations of existing actions, 
wrapped in high-level rhetoric. 
> EU policy-makers have not yet developed a con-
vincing Arctic narrative to broadly engage the 
EUropean public in Arctic matters. 
> Although no dramatic changes took place in the 
Arctic in the last years, security questions and 
high politics have become more visible. 
> The current main themes of the EU’s Arctic pol-
icy – climate, sustainable development and in-
ternational cooperation – should be kept. Cli-
mate change should not be the only pillar of the 
EU’s Arctic engagement. Policymakers need to 
propose concrete future-oriented actions for is-
sues such as marine litter. At the same time, the 
EU should not openly raise security questions. 
> To operationalize its policies, the EU should re-
consider the current institutional set-up of its 
Arctic policy, including ways to involve the Eu-
ropean Parliament and making internal long-
term coordination more effective. 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
Theorising the ENP – Conference Report 
© Author name 
CEPOB # 1.15 December 2015 
The EU’s Arctic Policy: Betwe n Vision and Reality 
© Adam Stępień & Andreas Raspotnik 
CEPOB # 5.19 – August 2019 
 
The Arctic setting: all quiet on the northern front? 
When pondering whether the EU should re-visit its policy to-
wards the Arctic, we first need to reflect if anything has 
changed in the region since the EU’s last policy document is-
sued in 2016. 
For Fridtjof Nansen, the famous Norwegian explorer, “the his-
tory of Arctic discovery shows how the development of the 
human race has always been borne along by great illusions” 
(Nansen 1911). Analysing Arctic developments, one is con-
stantly confronted with widespread illusions about the re-
gion’s present and its immediate future. 
When an average European thinks about the Arctic, climate 
change and its implications are likely to be among the key no-
tions. Therefore, one might think that ‘climate change’ and the 
EU’s self-proclaimed leadership in climate change mitigation 
could constitute a convincing narrative that attracts broader 
EUropean attention. This should be especially the case in the 
current political context: after a decade of being outper-
formed by economic, financial and migration-related crises, 
climate change appears to gradually return to the focus of 
public attention. In the Arctic, global warming occurs two 
times faster than on average globally, making the region cli-
mate change’s ‘canary in a coal mine’. However, the root 
causes of this transformation – greenhouse gas emissions – 
originate from outside the region. Thus, little mitigation can 
specifically be achieved via a distinct Arctic policy that aims to 
‘mitigate climate change’. At the same time, some Arctic 
stakeholders including regional authorities, business repre-
sentatives and even some indigenous politicians are con-
cerned that economic development in the region may be un-
justly hindered – as compared to other regions – due to the 
symbolism of the Arctic in global climate debates. Thus, if ‘cli-
mate change’ cannot be the sole axis of the EU’s Arctic dis-
course, one may wonder which other options for building a 
convincing narrative exist. Would addressing other, more indi-
rect implications of global warming – economic opportunities, 
resources and security questions – be more appealing? 
Starting from 2006-2007, many analysts have argued that the 
Arctic would become the world’s next energy frontier as well 
as the new ‘Mediterranean/Suez’ connecting Europe and Asia 
– a transformation driven by the accelerated melting of the 
Arctic Ocean sea ice, coupled with globalization and optimistic 
estimates of the region’s hydrocarbon potential. With the Arc-
tic coastal states – Canada, Denmark (via Greenland), Norway, 
Russia and the United States – placing the Arctic on their do-
mestic and foreign policy agenda, also non-Arctic states and 
entities, such as the EU, China, Japan and Korea, discovered 
their ‘Arcticness’. The world’s next geopolitical conflict over 
territories, resources and influence was assumed to be around 
the corner (Raspotnik 2018). 
In contrast to climate change impacts on the environment and 
Arctic livelihoods, the predicted economic boom and Arctic 
conflict have not materialized so far. However, that does not 
mean that economic development, strategic interests and 
high politics are absent from the Arctic region. In fact, the Arc-
tic landscape is changing. 
While it is unlikely that major transpolar shipping lanes and 
massive offshore oil exploitation emerge in the region in the 
near term, gradual economic developments and sea-borne ex-
ports of Arctic resources are on the rise, primarily within and 
from the Russian Arctic (Stępień et al. 2016). Furthermore, the 
international community was recently reminded of the exist-
ence of Arctic high politics by the confrontational tone of US 
Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo, who expressed concerns re-
garding Chinese regional activities and Russia’s encroach-
ments over the freedom of navigation along the Northern Sea 
Route (NSR). The Trump administration’s disruptive politics 
have indeed reached the Arctic. 
Despite justified criticism about the aggressive tone and the 
speech’s inappropriate timing – right before the Arctic Coun-
cil’s Ministerial Meeting in Rovaniemi (Finland) in May 2019 – 
the concerns expressed by Pompeo are not completely far-
fetched. Russia is the key Arctic state and the EU’s most im-
portant neighbour. There is clear willingness to selectively en-
gage with Russia in the Arctic. However, the country’s gradual 
military build-up in the region and new rules for foreign ves-
sels traversing the NSR are sources of anxiety also in EUrope. 
Similarly, there is a degree of suspicion regarding increasing 
Chinese activities in the Arctic, which include shipping, re-
search and resource cooperation with Russia. Although many 
stakeholders see Chinese financing as beneficial for the capi-
tal-poor region, others are concerned about the potential in-
fluence gained via such investments. And yet, apart from tak-
ing part in Russian oil and gas developments, Chinese pres-
ence in the Arctic still remains relatively modest. 
Furthermore, the Rovaniemi Ministerial Meeting added a new 
source of disquiet about the region’s future. The Arctic Council 
is one of the key pillars of a peaceful and cooperative Arctic. 
For over a decade, this forum for Arctic cooperation has been 
pervaded by climate work. However, at present, the Trump 
administration is against even uttering climate change lan-
guage, which led – for the first time – to the failure in adopting 
a ministerial declaration in Rovaniemi. This might well be a 
sign that Arctic politics are facing some sort of a tipping point. 
These challenges, among many others, are also highlighted by 
the EPSC (2019). The Strategic Note “Walking on Thin Ice: A 
Balanced Arctic Strategy for the EU” builds on the notion of a 
“There is an ongoing difficulty 
to develop a convincing 
EU-Arctic narrative.” 
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global power shift in international politics and economics, no-
tably with the rise of China. This global transformation is also 
manifest in the Arctic, resulting in increased strategic im-
portance of the region. With the region expected to become 
a(n even) hot(ter) topic in the coming decades, it is suggested 
that the EU should develop its own strategy for the future of 
the Arctic. Inferring from the EU’s Arctic past, one may wonder 
what such a ‘strategy’ could look like. Does naming an accu-
mulation of polices a ‘strategy’ effectively make a difference? 
Or would such a re-branding remain the continuation of a 
well-known Arctic catchphrase-collecting story? 
Moving forward: options and non-options 
A new document: need and purpose 
Considering the lessons from the 2016 Joint Communication, 
a new policy statement is likely to remain broad and – as indi-
cated above – built around three familiar themes: climate 
change, sustainable development and international coopera-
tion. Hence, ‘nothing new on the northern front’. And yet, 
there are good reasons for drafting a new document. First, the 
process of putting together an EU Arctic policy statement is an 
important and rare moment for internal reflection that brings 
together different EUropean actors around Arctic topics. Sec-
ond, a new document, notwithstanding its content, would 
communicate the EU’s continued Arctic commitment towards 
regional partners and stakeholders, as well as the EU’s own 
public. Third, there is a number of emerging issues that should 
be considered in an updated document, such as bioprospect-
ing, marine litter or more controversial questions related to 
hard security. Fourth, the adoption of a new document would 
allow for reconsidering whether the existing Arctic policy co-
ordination set-up – with Arctic work currently being led by the 
Directorate-General for Maritime Affairs and Fisheries (DG 
MARE) and the European External Action Service (EEAS) – is 
still the most appropriate one in light of new Arctic challenges 
and the broad scope of the EU’s Arctic policy. Below, we dis-
cuss these issues in greater depth. 
New topics, new focus? 
With the EU’s Arctic policy already including a broad spectrum 
of issues, we recommend that policy-makers agree on a short 
list of concrete future-oriented new actions and initiatives, ra-
ther than expand the well-known Arctic shopping list. Climate 
change, sustainable development and international coopera-
tion appropriately constitute the current set of themes. Refer-
ences to regional climate change impacts should be used more 
courageously to enhance the EU’s overall climate action. How-
ever, the EU should avoid suggesting that human activities in 
the region need to be limited merely because of the Arctic be-
ing a ‘symbol of global heating’. Supporting sustainable devel-
opment, especially in the European Arctic, requires concrete 
new actions, not just naming available sources of funding. A 
short list of tangible actions could include emerging issues like 
the problem of marine litter and microplastics pollution, the 
opportunities and risks related to bioprospecting, challenges 
pertaining to Arctic youth, or broader questions of digitaliza-
tion and urbanization processes in peripheral regions. The 
problematic issue to debate rather concerns international co-
operation, and whether – or how – to deal with Arctic high 
politics and related security questions. 
Keeping quiet again on hard security? 
It is certainly beneficial for EU policy-makers to be aware of 
geopolitical and economic developments in the Arctic (Keil & 
Raspotnik 2014). Especially Chinese investments, joint pro-
jects between China and Russia and Russian attempts to in-
crease control over navigation in its exclusive economic zone 
are sources of anxiety in EUrope. However, it remains ques-
tionable whether the expression of such concerns should be 
part of an updated EU Arctic policy document. There are lim-
ited benefits of outlining these issues openly, risking that such 
statements may artificially fuel conflict narratives and discour-
age the EU’s Arctic partners. 
Instead of such open statements, the EU could attempt to es-
tablish bilateral dialogues with China and Russia under a spe-
cific ‘Arctic umbrella’. Interest on the Russian side may be lim-
ited, but the EU should at least express its openness to selec-
tively engage with Russia in the Arctic and propose a related 
roadmap with relatively uncontroversial topics to discuss, in-
cluding environmental cooperation or cross-border business 
linkages. A separate EU-Arctic dialogue with China may raise 
concerns among Arctic actors. Hence, any closer cooperation 
and future engagement between the EU and China in the Arc-
tic should be transparent and focused on areas where both ac-
tors can be of benefit for the region, such as research, logistics 
or climate change mitigation. With regard to Arctic coopera-
tion troubles, the EU is unlikely to have leverage when it 
comes to shielding collaboration from US climate change de-
nialism. The only options are to maintain involvement in the 
activities of the Arctic Council at the working level and use 
other platforms to facilitate climate change assessment activ-
ities that cannot be carried out under the Arctic Council um-
brella in the current political climate. 
A different institutional set-up? 
The recent EP elections hold a certain disruptive potential for 
the EU’s political system, with the new EP bound to be 
younger and greener. This might elicit new Arctic interest 
among MEPs. Similarly to the EPSC (2019), we therefore pro-
pose a stronger role for the EP in shaping Arctic policy. 
“Expressing security concerns 
may fan the flames.” 
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Generally, a strengthened role for the EP is certainly appropri-
ate in light of enhancing the legitimacy of EU Arctic policy. 
However, ideas about what the Arctic is are so broad within 
the EP that, at least so far, the four EP Resolutions (2008, 2011, 
2014 and 2017) were merely compilations of thematically very 
diverse paragraphs. At the moment, it is difficult to imagine of 
how the Commission could find guidance in such Resolutions. 
Thus, we recommend the Commission and the EP to find in-
formal ways of working together on developing one short list 
of concrete future-oriented actions and initiatives. In this vein, 
a true inter-service and -institutional group, involving a trian-
gle of the Commission, EEAS and EP, could be envisaged. 
When it comes to the Commission’s own set-up, DG MARE cur-
rently shares coordination responsibilities with the EEAS, an 
arrangement based on the Integrated Maritime Policy origins 
of the EU’s Arctic endeavour back in 2006/2007. However, at 
present among the key elements of the EU’s Arctic policy are 
regional development in the European Arctic and the financing 
of innovation and research funding. Despite all of these sec-
tors holding some maritime component, one should honestly 
scrutinise the ‘Arctic leadership’ by DG MARE before drafting 
a new document. Might a different DG be better suited to lead 
the Arctic debate within the Commission? 
Currently, the EU’s Arctic policy is a cross-sectoral one and any 
coordinator needs to deal with issues outside of their policy 
comfort zone. The fact that DG MARE has been associated 
with Arctic issues for over a decade has an intrinsic value. 
However, a high turnover of officials responsible for the Arctic 
within DG MARE has hampered institutional memory and led 
to the perception of policy transience among Arctic stakehold-
ers. It would be beneficial to allow a small team to work on 
Arctic issues over longer terms, thereby acquiring good under-
standing of the related work by their colleagues from DG 
CLIMA (for Climate Action), DG MOVE (for Mobility and 
Transport), DG REGIO (for Regional and Urban Policy), etc. 
Yet, whatever the institutional set-up, EU policy-makers en-
gaged in Arctic affairs should make greater efforts to ensure 
that specific Arctic concerns are included in concrete sectoral 
decision-making, funding distribution via interregional and 
cross-border programmes and investment financing, or regu-
latory impact assessments when the Commission produces 
new policy and legislative proposals that may be Arctic-rele-
vant. That seems to already work well with regard to the Arc-
tic’s place in the EU’s research policy. Yet, this is particularly 
important in areas where EU legislation can affect the EU’s en-
vironmental footprint in the Arctic, as is the case of its clean 
air policy, which may limit the amount of black carbon reach-
ing northern latitudes from EUrope. 
A process as important as the outcome 
Formulating a relatively coherent policy towards a large trans-
national region is a difficult task, perhaps even a mission im-
possible. On the one hand, there are multiple disconnected 
policies, initiatives and actions, as well as various stakeholders 
who have little in common apart from being placed under a 
regional umbrella. This is not only an Arctic problem, as for in-
stance the EU’s macro-regional and sea basin strategies share 
similar characteristics. On the other hand, the region and thus 
its policy occupies a relatively marginal place in the EU’s policy 
system, attracting limited genuine (i.e. non-superficial) atten-
tion. Defining a clear, convincing narrative while at the same 
time maintaining a balance between different interests and 
expectations is a formidable challenge. However, this brief 
shows that a key value of the EU’s Arctic policy is the Union’s 
chance to regularly reflect on its ‘Arcticness’, engage with re-
gional and Arctic-relevant stakeholders, and rethink its influ-
ence and presence. The process of finding a convincing narra-
tive is perhaps as important as the appropriate phrasing of pol-
icy statements. What the EU needs is to boost the ongoing Arc-
tic policy-making process, which can be achieved by 1) creat-
ing more continuity and institutional memory due to a long-
term involvement of policy officials, 2) further enhancing in-
ter-service communication, 3) better involving regional stake-
holders, and 4) trying to propose a set of tangible actions re-
lated to areas such as specific changes in intraregional funding 
distribution or even concrete project proposals, means for en-
hancing EU Arctic research funding, and specific new financing 
options for European Arctic projects. An ongoing reassess-
ment is crucial in times of Arctic change, with the region’s ge-
opolitical scene becoming populated by new actors and re-
gional cooperation being threatened by climate change deni-
alism. An Arctic-minded EU will not solve all of the regional is-
sues on its own, but it can certainly support activities and ini-
tiatives that could carry Arctic cooperation through difficult 
times, such as Arctic climate change projects, continued gen-
erous funding for Arctic research, or the fostering of bilateral 
relations with key Arctic actors. 
A visionary Arctic policy for the 21st century? 
From an EU perspective, the Arctic could be much more than 
what it currently is, namely a marginal policy area wrapped 
up in high-level rhetoric. One might contemplate if the Arctic 
can eventually be a laboratory for a stronger, more coherent, 
truly supranational EU foreign policy. Could the EU’s Arctic 
policy be one that looks not only five years ahead, but 20, 30 
or even 50? One that puts the future of the Arctic in the con-
text of broader global developments beyond the ‘simple’ 
melting of the region’s (sea) ice and ‘old-school’, geopolitical 
security concerns, addressing issues such as global develop-
ments tackling the nexus of climate change, migration and 
demographic changes, or the future of food production and 
artificial intelligence? While necessary to pose, these are not 
questions to be answered here. Maybe instead of only retro-
actively addressing the challenges arising from Arctic change, 
the region and its peripheral status could provide ample food 
for thought about our future in times of lacking global visions. 
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